Synopsis: Governments, corporations and civilisations claim to share values with one another, and that claim earns them a special status that facts alone could never grant. Australia’s devotion to an America that keeps changing shows what happens when that status meets reality.
I’ve lived in Thailand for the better part of twenty years. In all that time nobody has asked me whether I share or have adopted Thai values. If someone did, I would struggle to respond. Which values would they mean? The courtesy that seats a family meal in order of age, or the cheerful irreverence with which my neighbours discuss their superiors once the superiors’ cars have gone? The serenity of the temple at the end of the lane, or the lottery tickets sold at its gate? What binds me here is far more particular: a marriage, a family, a rice farm with a pond that swells every wet season, a village whose rhythms I’m still learning. Nor did I leave Britain for Australia because I had assessed the nation’s values and found them offensive or wanting.
People seldom choose a country by auditing its moral catalogue. They follow someone they love, an offer of employment, a hunch about where their children might flourish. Belonging grows from particulars. It’s never conferred by a creed. Yet the moment individuals become institutions, the audit is declared complete.
Governments, corporations, alliances, even whole societies insist they’re bound together by shared values. The phrase performs a specific function. It lifts a relationship out of the register of interests, where it could be examined, priced and renegotiated, and places it in the register of kinship, where questioning starts to look like betrayal. Families aren’t audited. That’s the point of calling yourself one.
An email arrived last week from Leanne Minshull at the Australia Institute. It put the problem with unusual bluntness. If America is Australia’s friend because of shared values, she asked, to which America are we referring? The country whose voters, in this month’s midterms, sent Abdul El-Sayed to the Senate from Michigan on a platform of universal healthcare? Or the country whose Secretary of War, Pete Hegseth, now faces eight articles of impeachment, tabled by a Republican congressman, accusing him of waging war on Iran without the authority of Congress, rolling back protections for civilians and ordering lethal strikes on suspected drug traffickers in the Caribbean and the Pacific? Both men are American. Both would claim American values. Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Richard Marles, has said the two nations share values including democracy and the rule of law. He didn’t say which Americans he had in mind.
A nation isn’t a person. It’s barely even a fact: most nation-states are younger than the people now governing them, their borders drawn by surveyors and colonial clerks, their sense of themselves assembled in classrooms and on parade grounds. In the case of America it’s a running argument among hundreds of millions of people, most of whom couldn’t find Australia on a map: an argument conducted through elections, courts, newspapers, pulpits and kitchen tables, and one that never reaches a verdict. To speak of a nation’s values is to freeze that argument at a convenient moment, usually the moment that suits the speaker, then treat that moment as the nation’s character.
Most of us go to our graves without settling our own values. The proposition that a nation’s worth of strangers has settled theirs, and that they coincide with ours, is a fiction sustained only because it’s politically useful.
But useful to whom? Watch how the same device behaves elsewhere. In the 1990s, leaders in Singapore and Malaysia advanced a doctrine of Asian values, arguing that societies built on order, family and consensus couldn’t be judged by Western notions of individual rights. Critics in Washington and London dismissed it as a shield for authoritarian rule. To some extent they were right. But the same critics were busily deploying their own version, Western values, as a passport to intervene wherever they chose. Both claims did identical service. Each conferred belonging on those inside the circle, deafness towards those outside it, and silence upon the dissenters within, whether Malaysian democrats or American pacifists.
Corporations learned the trick too. One of the most celebrated values statements in modern times was a lobby banner proclaiming integrity and respect, displayed in the headquarters of an energy company that collapsed in one of the largest frauds in American history. The banner wasn’t false advertising so much as a membership badge. It told everyone inside they belonged to a club that was finer than a balance sheet.
Here’s the curious turn in Minshull’s argument. I don’t raise it to score a point, since I recognise the reflex in my own writing. Having dismissed shared values as an ill-defined and constantly shifting basis for an alliance, she reaches straight back for them. Whose values do we share, she asks, El-Sayed’s or Hegseth’s? That question implies a better America with which Australians might legitimately align and a worse one that needs to be shunned at all costs. Even the sharpest critics of values talk, it seems, struggle to do without it. The vocabulary flatters everyone who uses it. It promises that our allegiances flow from our virtues rather than from our fears, our debts or our geography.
Which brings the distinction that matters into view. Alignment is a judgement about interests, provisional by nature, open to revision whenever circumstances shift. Loyalty is a disposition, and its defining feature is resistance to revision. A country that aligns with another can reassess at any time without shame. A country that is loyal to another experiences reassessment as apostasy. The danger in any alliance arrives when the first slides unnoticed into the second, when asking what a commitment costs begins to sound like asking whether you love your mother.
Values talk would wither quickly without help from the body. Flags, anthems, flypasts, two national songs played one after the other at a state dinner: these do what argument can’t. They raise the hair on the forearm and tighten the throat, and in that moment the listener supplies the certainty the actual words never earned. In Thailand the anthem sounds across stations, markets and parks at eight each morning and six each evening, and people stop where they stand. Foreigners often pause with them, out of courtesy rather than conviction. Even they can feel something stir inside them, which suggests the feeling belongs to the ritual rather than to any creed. A crowd singing together experiences its own unity and mistakes it for agreement about what the song means.
Even the songs refuse to hold still. Australia’s anthem began life in 1878 as four verses celebrating Britannia and Captain Cook raising England’s flag. By the time it was proclaimed in 1984 the imperial verses had gone, replaced by lines first sung at Federation. In 2021 a single word changed, young becoming one, in recognition of peoples who had lived on the continent for tens of thousands of years before any verse was written. Each generation sang its version as though the words had always been so. Loyalty is cultivated in this register, beneath the reach of reason, which is why it survives evidence so comfortably. An alignment can be argued out of existence. A feeling rehearsed since childhood has to be outlived.
Commerce draws on the same emotional reserve. Qantas, still called Australia’s flag carrier, has flown under the slogan The Spirit of Australia since 1984, its best-loved advertisements built around a children’s choir singing of home. This month, shortly after reporting a net profit of $1.3 billion, the airline announced that around 850 corporate roles in finance, procurement, human resources and marketing would pass to a global consultancy, with most of the work delivered from India. It’s tempting to say the slogan should go. Yet the decision probably expresses the company’s values more faithfully than any advertisement ever did. An accountant in India can balance the same accounts as one in Sydney, and from her desk the spirit in question was always on offer to whichever workforce the balance sheet preferred. The slogan sold belonging to passengers. The board was never bound by it.
The drift from alignment to loyalty helps explain why secrecy and values rhetoric so often travel together. AUKUS was negotiated behind closed doors and presented to Australians as a done deal; it was justified less by evidence than by appeals to kinship with other English-speaking democracies. A contract can be inspected clause by clause, whereas a covenant asks only to be honoured. Earlier this year a citizens’ public inquiry, lacking any power to compel witnesses, heard from former prime ministers, foreign ministers and defence ministers about whether the pact would make Australia safer, and at what price. The government declined to appear. One former Liberal defence minister, Linda Reynolds, later complained in print that the inquiry had placed America in the dock while authoritarian regimes escaped equivalent scrutiny. Her complaint revealed more than she intended. Loyalty decides where suspicion is allowed to point. It trains a hard eye on rivals but closes it when the gaze turns towards the partner, or towards ourselves.
Loyalty also flows downhill. While the minor partner’s devotion is assumed, the major partner’s protection is conditional, recalculated in every budget cycle and at every change of administration. Would Washington ever accept from Canberra the conditions it routinely attaches to its own commitments? Australians have long spoken of great and powerful friends, a phrase from the Menzies era that betrays its own premise. Friends of equal standing don’t need to be described as powerful. The adjective confesses the dependency the noun conceals.
Then there’s time. AUKUS commits Australia to a trajectory reaching into the 2050s, at a stated cost of $368 billion and rising. The America that signed the agreement won’t be the America that delivers the submarines, if they’re delivered at all. Between signature and handover lie possibly eight presidential elections, unknowable wars, economic shocks and realignments that nobody can foresee. A pledge whose life outlasts the partner’s political memory isn’t an alliance with a country. It’s a wager on a stranger, a nation that doesn’t yet exist, whose values will be whatever its voters and its courts and its money decide in decades nobody has yet lived.
Much of the world understood this long ago and organised its statecraft around it. In 1948, as the Cold War hardened, Indonesia’s vice-president Mohammad Hatta described his country’s foreign policy as rowing between two reefs, refusing to be drawn into either bloc while trading and talking with both. Seven years later the Bandung conference gathered newly independent nations determined to keep that freedom of movement. Thai diplomats describe their own tradition through the image of bamboo, rooted firmly yet bending with whichever wind is blowing, a habit many historians credit with helping Siam survive the colonial era with its sovereignty intact.
These traditions make no pretence of affection between states. They treat the relations between nations as they are: plural, revisable, unsentimental. They preserve the one capacity that defines sovereignty in practice, the capacity to say no. An ally you can’t refuse is a patron, however warmly the speeches describe the friendship.
Australians, it seems, are reaching similar conclusions without the benefit of doctrine. A YouGov poll commissioned by the Australia Institute found that only one in six Australians regard the United States as a close friend, while roughly two-thirds see Indonesia as a friend. An earlier survey for the same institute found that fewer than one in ten Australians were fully convinced the two countries share values at all. China tells a similar story. In the Lowy Institute’s 2026 poll, trust in America to act responsibly fell to 31%, the lowest ever recorded, while trust in China rose to 28%. Four years earlier the gap had been fifty-three points. Most respondents now see China more as an economic partner than a security threat, even as six in ten still expect it to become a military threat within twenty years. The public, untrained in the rhetoric of kinship, appears to have done what individuals always do. It looked at particulars. It noticed that the partner had changed and declined to pretend otherwise.
My own allegiance to this place attaches to my wife’s family, to my Thai friends, to a village whose rhythms I’m still learning, to a soil I barely understand. It would survive a change of government in Bangkok, because it was never pledged to one. A nation that pledges itself to another nation has no such anchor. When the partner shifts, it faces a choice the rhetoric of kinship was designed to hide: either it renegotiates the alliance, which loyalty forbids, or it revises itself, adjusting what it tolerates, what it condemns and what it is prepared to overlook so the match can be preserved.
